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The Constitution, Law, and American Life is a collection of 
essays that discusses selected aspects of law in nineteenth century 
America. The essays include one on Lincoln, slavery, and the 
intentions of the Framers; one on a South Bend fugitive slave 
case; one on Minor v. Happersett3, the 1875 case where Mrs. Mi-
nor claimed (unsuccessfully) that the federal Constitution guar-
anteed women the right to vote; one on African Americans and 
equalitarian constitutionalism; one on the relation of Victorian 
moralism and civil liberty; one on nineteenth century drug laws; 
one on commitment law in Alabama; and finally one on munici-
pal reform in Chicago. The essays are in honor of Harold Hy-
man, the distinguished legal historian, and the authors of the 
essays are themselves distinguished historians. 
In his introduction, Donald Nieman, the editor of the vol-
ume, suggests common themes: the authors, he says, look at law 
in practice, understand the law in its broader social context, and 
understand the past on its own terms. If readers look beyond 
these claims about method, however, they will find the subjects 
covered in the book quite diverse. The result is a challenge for a 
reviewer. Each of the essays could merit its own review, by a 
person familiar with its particular subject. Or a particularly inge-
nious reviewer might find connections between municipal reform 
in Chicago and Lincoln, slavery, and the intent of the Framers. 
Since I lack the knowledge necessary for the first course and the 
1. Professor of History, Clemson University. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. 
3. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875). 
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ingenuity necessary for the second, I will discuss a couple of the 
essays and leave exploration of the rest entirely to the reader. 
Phillip Paludan looks at Lincoln, slavery, and the intentions 
of the Framers. Paludan, like Lincoln, thinks most of the Fram-
ers looked forward to a day when slavery would wither away and 
disappear from the constitutional system. While protecting slav-
ery, he believes the Framers sought to quarantine it, to keep it 
from "overthrowing the larger system." According to Paludan, 
the Framers created a system of republican government inher-
ently hostile to slavery-for republican government by its very 
nature pre-supposes freedom of speech and of the press, free-
doms that endangered slavery. The Northwest Ordinance cer-
tainly supports the idea of a plan to quarantine slavery. But the 
failure to extend its prohibition to the old Southwest raises a 
question of the depth of that commitment. 
While important elements of the constitutional order 
threatened slavery, the Framers designed other constitutional 
provisions to protect slavery. Those threatened liberty. Faced 
with demands from the deep South, the Framers protected slav-
ery-for example, first in the clause counting slaves as three-
fifths of a person for purposes of representation in the House 
and in the electoral college and, second, in the fugitive slave 
clause. 
So one reasonable historical reading is that the Framers, like 
most of us, had inconsistent purposes-liberty and recognition of 
slavery-and sought to achieve them both. This double bind cre-
ated a republic with multiple personalities-the land of liberty 
that held people as slaves and periodically sought (in the North 
as well as the South) to shut up those who complained about it. 
This explanation (though it might be mistaken) does not seem to 
me to pose an inherent problem for the historian committed to 
taking the past on its own messy terms. But it hardly works for 
the politician seeking to find the best meaning of our past or for 
the lawyer (or historian) seeking (as Paludan suggests we should) 
the best interpretation of the Constitution. Neither can simply 
argue for an unresolved tension, for a past that had enfolded 
within it radically different implications. 
To understand slavery and the intent of the Framers, 
Paludan looks to legal analysis. He cites Ronald Dworkin4 for 
the proposition that "legal reasoning is an exercise in construc-
tive interpretation," seeking the best justification of legal prac-
4. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Belknap Press, 1986). 
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tices possible in light of constraints posed by precedent, the past, 
and the necessity of consent. And he seconds Charles Black's5 
call for a structural analysis of the Constitution---.,.for interpreting 
the Constitution based on how it should function as a whole. So, 
Paludan suggests, free speech on national questions and the right 
to petition the national government can be inferred from how a 
republican government must function, as well as (though 
Paludan says instead of) from specific texts protecting them. 
In fact, in the years before and immediately after the Civil 
War, Republicans also thought free speech on state issues was 
protected, sometimes on textual grounds and sometimes because 
that was what the republican government the Framers envisioned 
for the states entailed.6 Paludan shows, as indeed Charles Black 
has, that lawyers have been using structural reasoning for a very 
long time. 
Paludan suggests that these legal modes of analysis help us 
to understand the problems Lincoln confronted and the method 
of interpretation he used. Lincoln read the Constitution in light 
of its commitment to liberty, and he read that commitment in 
light of the Declaration of Independence. Paludan quotes Lin-
coln's numinous reconciliation of the promise of the Declaration 
with the fact of slavery. I include somewhat more of the passage 
than Paludan does: 
I think the authors of [the Declaration of Independence] in-
tended to include all men .... They did not mean to assert the 
obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that 
equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it immedi-
ately upon them .... They meant simply to declare the right, so 
that enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances 
should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for 
free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all; 
constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though 
never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and 
thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and 
augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all 
colors everywhere.? 
5. Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (LSU 
Press, 1969). 
6. Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impend· 
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7. Abraham Lincoln, Speeches and Writings 1832-1858 398 (Library of America, 
1989) 
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The passage is about ideals and what to make of them when the 
reality of our practice falls short, as it always does. Lincoln and 
the Republicanss did not argue that the ideal could cancel the 
reality of slavery or the parts of the Constitutional text that pro-
tected it. Rather they argued that the Constitution should be in-
terpreted whenever possible (given the constraints of the text 
and history) to further the ideal. So when Paludan seeks to use 
ideas of Dworkin or Charles Black to help us understand the 
Constitutional thought of Lincoln, he is on to something (though 
Lincoln was so convinced that history showed that the Framers 
intended to limit slavery that he felt no need, on that issue, to go 
beyond their historic intent).9 To take the exercise one step fur-
ther, as Paludan does, and use it to understand the thought of the 
Framers of the Constitution and the purposes of the Constitution 
seems to be also a legitimate, but not simply historical, 
undertaking. 
Paludan has elected to look at the Constitution and slavery 
as a lawyer would and to look for the predominant or "better" 
meaning. This he does by modes of analysis long used by law-
yers, though brilliantly illuminated by, for example, the explica-
tion of Black. So it is curious, to say the least, to find this 
intriguing and provocative essay peppered with snide remarks 
about lawyers. "Lawyers are interested in winning their cases, 
and historians in telling the truth." Alas. Lawyers, of course, 
function as one part of a truth seeking mechanism, so Paludan 's 
analysis is incomplete. Lawyers, Paludan insists, seek to narrow 
rather than broaden the context. " 'If you can think about some-
thing that is related to something, without thinking about what it 
is related to, you can be a lawyer.'" There is no doubt that this is 
so for legal analysis at its worst, but by that standard similar an-
nouncements could be made about any profession. 
Paludan sees Lincoln as Hercules unbound, the paragon of 
wise constitutional analysis. Lincoln was a very good lawyer, and 
a reading of his speeches on slavery shows how legal methods 
shaped his thinking and ordered his analysis.to Perhaps Profes-
sor Paludan's cracks about lawyers simply reveal a deep seated 
discomfort by a historian long schooled in the shortcomings of 
lawyers, who finds himself using some of the lawyer's tools of 
analysis. "What," a still small voice may be asking, "will my 
8. Abraham Lincoln, Speeches and Writings 1859-1865111-30 (Library of America, 
1989). 
9. Id. 
10. ld. at 31-58, 111-30, 132-50. 
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mentors and colleagues say about this?" Perhaps unconsciously 
Paludan seeks to deflect criticism for using an analysis at least as 
legal as it is historical and to do so by trotting out the cliches 
about legal thinking. I am unsure how professional historians 
will respond, but I guess most are tolerant of methodological di-
versity and could have taken the medicine without the sugar 
coating of lawyer bashing. Paludan has used legal methods in a 
fruitful way-but one that is somewhat different from simply 
taking the past on its own terms. 
Indeed, legal analysis has some purely historical justifica-
tion: it provides insight as to how at least some lawyers saw the 
problem of slavery and the Constitution. So, in another way, 
perhaps, Professor Paludan's emphasis on legal analysis is histor-
ically appropriate, too-appropriate because Lincoln and many 
other leaders at the time were lawyers and tended to see the 
world, at least partly, through the lens of legal analysis. The his-
torian who sees the world through the eyes of his subject has 
taken a step toward a deeper understanding of the past. 
If Paludan's essay goes beyond taking the past simply on its 
own terms, Paul Finkelman's essay on the South Bend fugitive 
slave case seems to highlight the importance of legal doctrine-
in this case nineteenth century pleading rules. If Paludan looks 
at global issues of slavery, legal method, and the Constitution, 
Professor Finkelman looks at one fugitive slave case that exem-
plifies some of the tensions inherent in a document that sought to 
protect both slavery and liberty. 
Professor Finkelman tells the complex story of the Powell 
family. The family had been held in slavery in Kentucky, es-
caped to Michigan after being taken by their master to a free 
state, and was forcibly recaptured by their "owner." The family 
was in tum freed by a state court writ of habeas corpus, enforced 
at one point by armed local citizens. In his return to the writ, the 
"owner" alleged that the Powells were his slaves, a fact unhappily 
not denied by the attorney for the slaves. 
Unable to hold his captives in the face of an organized group 
that helped enforce the state court's order, the "owner" filed suit 
in federal court under the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law against those 
who had interfered with his recapture of the Powell family. 
Supreme Court Justice John McLean, on circuit, followed the 
Supreme Court's decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,ll including its 
rule allowing the "owner" to seize "his slaves" and return them 
11. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) 
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to slavery without the intervention of legal process. McLean in-
structed the jury that the Powells' counsel's failure to deny the 
allegation that they were slaves, contained in the return to the 
petition of habeas corpus, was an admission that they were 
slaves. As a result the state judge lacked jurisdiction and local 
citizens enforcing his order were violating supreme federal law. 
The story is a remarkable picture of the Fugitive Slave Law 
in operation, and of the competing forces (not the least of which 
is legal doctrine) that shape legal decisions. Finkelman suggests 
that the decision sacrificed substantial justice, even acknowledg-
ing the institution of slavery. This was so because the Powells, 
voluntarily taken by their master to free territory, might have 
been legally free as a result. Even today, with substantially more 
liberal rules of procedure, a lawyer's failure to follow procedural 
requirements can sacrifice substantial rights. 
In Reconstructing Female Citizenship: Minor v. Happersett, 
by Norma Basch, and The Language of Liberation, by Donald 
Nieman, the authors examine two groups excluded from many 
civic promises of American life-women and African Ameri-
cans. Generally, both followed similar political strategies: they 
insisted that the nation's broadly phrased promises of equality, 
republican government, and rights must include them also. 
Because of the disability of married women to sue, Virginia 
Minor's suit seeking the right to vote had to be brought through 
her husband. He also served as her counsel. Advocates of wo-
men's suffrage confronted a Fourteenth Amendment that penal-
ized states that did not enfranchise any part of their 21-year old 
male (but not female) inhabitants and a Fifteenth Amendment 
that prohibited denial of the right to vote based on race, but not 
based on sex. Virginia Minor's arguments ranged from finding 
women's suffrage in the guarantee of republican government in 
Article IV to finding it re-confirmed in section one of the Four-
teenth Amendment. They were claims that Basch sees as 
doomed to legal failure. 
Women were generally denied the right to vote and, for mar-
ried women, even the right to control their property. Free 
speech, press, petition, and test cases were means by which wo-
men's rights activists brought their claims to the attention of the 
political system. Virginia Minor's brief openly acknowledged the 
aspirational and inspirational nature of the suit. Just as slavery 
had once been considered a matter for exclusive state control, 
the brief announced, so many accepted unlimited state control 
over the elective franchise. But as in the case of slavery, this 
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view "must and will give way to a truer and better understanding 
of the subject. The plaintiff's case is simply one of the means by 
which this end will ultimately be reached." So from the ashes of 
defeat rose the Phoenix of an invigorated national campaign for 
women's suffrage. As Basch puts it, "[t]he demands for woman 
suffrage did not die when the decision was rendered; they ac-
quired a contentious national life." 
As Basch sees it, women could only challenge their exclu-
sion from suffrage by using the "rights-oriented, 'masculine'" 
rhetoric of the constitutional order. By some contemporary un-
derstandings the rhetoric of rights is deeply suspect.tz But it was 
the rhetoric of the early movement for women's rights. At least 
in the case of the English and American Revolutions, those who 
launched the revolutions based their case on broad ideals. The 
ideals, like ideas of popular sovereignty and fundamental rights, 
served to rally popular support. They also provided a basis by 
which previously excluded groups could appeal for inclusion and 
enfranchisement. The Levellers of the English Revolution, the 
American campaign for universal suffrage for men unlimited by 
property qualifications, the crusade against slavery, and the bat-
tle for women's rights are cases of the pattern repeating itself. 
In a similar vein, Donald Nieman tells a neglected story of 
the role played by African Americans seeking equality and equal 
rights. Most African American leaders in the North rejected the 
Garrisionian view of the Constitution as a covenant with death. 
As one put it in 1851, "I consider the Constitution the foundation 
of American liberties, and wrapping myself in the flag of the na-
tion, I would plant myself upon that Constitution, and using the 
weapons they have given me, I would appeal to the American 
people for the rights thus guaranteed." Nieman tells of state-by-
state struggles by African Americans for the vote, for integrated 
education, and equal access to public accommodations in the 
years 1830-1950. 
The Constitution, Law, and American Life, Critical Aspects 
of the Nineteenth-Century Experience has the strengths and weak-
nesses of a collection of essays by different authors with different 
interests. Although portions of the book share an underlying 
theme, there is little connection between many of the essays, ex-
cept that they deal with law and the nineteenth century. The 
book does not claim to deal with all aspects of nineteenth cen-
tury law. Although the book focuses on race and gender, it lacks 
12. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 Rev. Const. Stud. 1, 1-
26 (1993). 
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any essay on those who suffered from and challenged the domi-
nant economic arrangements of the nineteenth century. Labor, 
unions, and populists do not appear in the essays. 
As noted above, the introduction attempts to find common 
ground among the essays. The essays, its tells us, focus on "law 
in actual practice: the social functions of the law, the cultural val-
ues embodied in law, and the meaning of the Constitution and 
law to the powerless." These are pursued "[i]nstead of examin-
ing formal lawmaking bodies and the development of doctrine." 
The past is understood on its own terms. 
But of course, as the essays in the book illustrate, we see the 
past from the vantage point of the present. It cannot be any 
other way. Legal history is a great patchwork quilt.B Doctrine, 
formal lawmaking bodies, and the present meaning of the past 
are inevitably part of the picture, a picture enriched by fine es-
says in this book. 
APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
ISRAEL AND IN THE UNITED STATES. By Gary Jef-
frey Jacobsohn.1 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univer-
sity Press. 1993. Pp. 284. Cloth $39.50. 
Michel Rosenfeld2 
What is the difference between constitutionalism and consti-
tution? Does constitutionalism embody universal norms that 
transcend differences in historical experiences and in political 
culture? Is adherence to constitutionalism possible without a 
written constitution? Can constitutions be transplanted from one 
political culture to another? These are important and topical 
questions in the wake of the dramatic contemporary tum towards 
constitutionalism and recent proliferation of constitutions.3 In-
deed, as more and more countries rush to embrace constitution-
13. The metaphor is not mine, but I cannot recall where I got it. 
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